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Abstract: This paper provides my reflections on the state of economic methodology and 
philosophy of economics as of the beginning of 2020 following the end a fifteen year co-
editorship of the Journal of Economic Methodology with Wade Hands.  It looks at how economic 
methodology and philosophy of economics, as a meta-field type of research, has changed since it 
emerged as a distinct subfield in economics in the 1980s.  Using an evolution of technology 
analysis, it distinguishes two different possible scenarios for the field’s future according to 
environmental factors operating upon it and how specialization in research may affect both it and 
economics, and then makes a crossdisciplinarity argument for its further development as a 
diverse, pluralistic domain of research.  
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1.  Introduction: Whither methodology and philosophy of economics? 
 
This paper provides my reflections on the state of economic methodology as of 2020 following 
the end of my co-editorship with Wade Hands of the Journal of Economic Methodology that 
began in 2005 and ended in January 2020.  It is in some respects a companion piece to Hands’ 
own reflections (or ‘post-Reflection’ reflections) paper a year ago in this journal (Hands, 2019) 
because it draws on our shared experience editing the journal.  Hands also sees his paper as a 
companion piece to Dan Hausman’s retrospective paper on philosophy of economics published 
in this journal a year earlier (Hausman, 2018), and so my paper at one further remove can be 
seen as a further contribution to an on-going discussion regarding the current state and possible 
future of economic methodology and philosophy of economics.  Though of course we all differ 
in our views, several things seem to link our different contributions.   
 
1 I am grateful to Roger Backhouse, Gilles Campagnolo, Ricardo Crespo, Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, Zohreh 
Emami, Wade Hands, Emmanuel Picavet, Andrej Svorencik and the Editorial Board of this journal for helpful 




First, they are forward-looking and backward-looking.  We all try to understand the state of 
economic methodology and philosophy of economics in terms of where it is going by reflecting 
upon its history and what it has been.  The underlying assumption we share is that a history that 
exhibits direction tells us something about its destination.   
 
Second, we all largely agree that there is considerable change and even discontinuity in the field 
over time.  What people thought was important several decades ago – the Kuhnian-Popperian-
Lakatosian ‘demarcationist’ normative ‘theory appraisal’ approach or methodology with a big 
‘M’ – no longer is, or at most not very important.   
 
Third, whereas in the past there was considerable agreement among methodologists and 
philosophers of economics regarding what the main issues and subjects of investigation were, 
now the situation is quite the opposite.  There are many currents in the field today, and few in the 
field believe we can easily say what links them, what subjects are foundational, and what the 
future holds for methodology and philosophy of economics. 
 
These three features, and especially the third, motivated a special (soon to appear) issue of the 
Journal of Economic Methodology that Hands and I have organized made up of a number of 
short papers on the state of the field as a close to our editorship.  The model for this special issue 
was another special issue in the journal twenty years earlier with the same project titled, 
“Millennium Symposium: The past, present and future of economic methodology.”  At that time, 
Mark Blaug was the Executive Editor, Roger Backhouse, Kevin Hoover, and Uskali Mäki were 
Editors, and Matthias Klaes was Managing Editor of the Journal.    
 
Hands and I thought it would be interesting if the contributions to our issue could be compared 
with the contributions to the earlier issue.  That might tell us whether greater clarity about the 
nature of the field had developed in the last two decades.  Indeed, to make the comparison 
between our issue and that previous one all the more clear, we asked essentially the same 
questions (only very modestly revised and updated) of our contributors that the previous editors 
had asked of theirs: 
 
1. What has been achieved in economic methodology over the past two decades? 
2. What are the most promising developments in the field? 
3. How should economic methodology to be of greater use to practicing economists? 
4. Should developments in other disciplines play a great role in economic methodology? 
5. What sort of relations between methodology and other disciplines ought there be? 
6. What developments in economists’ practices ought methodologists know more about? 
7. What balance should there be between explaining economics and appraising it? 
  
 
Our expectation was that that both sets of contributors would agree about the second point above 
– that the Kuhnian-Popperian-Lakatosian ‘demarcationist’ normative ‘theory appraisal’ approach 
was still a feature of the past and continued to have little place in economic methodology today.  
Partly because of this, we also imagined that the first issue – that historical backward-looking 
reflection is a means to a forward-looking one – might seem less important to contributors today 
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than twenty years ago.  As the field’s past becomes more distant, and people who have not lived 
it increasingly come to dominate the field, that particular past has less weight.  I also wonder 
myself whether this might mean that the far distant past of the field, from J.S. Mill through to 
Lionel Robbins, might be of less interest today than it arguably was at the time of the 
Millennium issue of the Journal.  More on all this below.     
 
However, what Hands and I believed most strongly we would see from the contributors to the 
new symposium was that the third matter would even more strongly reflect how contributors 
would see the field today than twenty years ago.  We felt this based on our fifteen year 
experience as editors of the Journal over which time there were fewer and fewer papers of a 
synthetic nature that sought to take stock of the field and more and more papers that focused on 
new initiatives without emphasizing how they fit into past research.   
 
In one respect, we may have encouraged our contributors in this regard because we asked them 
to write on what they believed were important ‘new developments’ in the field, both to acquaint 
our readers with innovations they might be especially familiar with and to give our contributors 
relatively free reign.  But this emphasis does not exclude more backward-looking, stock-taking 
types of papers, and indeed some take reflection as their jumping off point.  I recall, then, that 
when we conceived of this special issue we asked ourselves whether there recently existed new 
major overviews of the field comparable to Hands’ own Reflections book (2001), Marcel 
Boumans and my introductory text (2010), and Julian Reiss’s more recent book (2013).  Our 
sense was writing such books today would be a daunting task and perhaps a bit of a gamble!  
This is not to say that such books are not in process – I have heard of several.   
 
To be clear, then, Hands and I, as no doubt others, strongly welcome papers that emphasize 
innovation and new developments in the field.  Any field undergoes deepening and widening as 
it develops, and for those in it this is exciting and interesting.  At the same time, however, a 
field’s development should arguably build upon its past rather than simply abandon it, or it risks 
becoming so diverse and possibly fragmented that it ceases to be an identifiable single field of 
research.  What is the balance, then, between continuity and change?  To address the question, 
the next section offers an evolutionary explanation of how fields of research may change over 
time, treating research fields as ‘technologies’ of investigation.  In the section following, I then 
use this framework to describe how economic methodology has actually changed as a research 
field in its short history since it emerged as a distinct subfield in economics in the 1980s.  In the 
sections following, I then speculate about how the field might continue to develop in the future.   
 
 
2. Evolution of fields of research as evolution of technologies 
 
The advantage, then, of examining the field of economic methodology from an evolutionary 
perspective is that it makes the balance between continuity and change in the field central to our 
understanding of it. Rather than trying to define the field in a single, ‘essentialist’ way apart from 
the circumstances under which it has become a recognizable field of investigation, an 
evolutionary approach allows us to determine what the field is and may become according to 
how it has developed and may further develop.  
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The field’s emergence in the 1980s, then, is my starting point because, though its subject matter, 
the nature and practice of economic science, had been clearly recognized at least since J.S. Mill 
more than a century earlier, and though there were important debates about methodological 
issues in the interwar period, in the 1980s the field rather suddenly displayed a relatively high 
level of new activity addressing new questions and topics, and came to be seen as an independent 
area of research (though one first thought to be part of the history of economics).  This 
development, then, constituted an important measure of its success as a ‘new’ type of 
investigation, and the volume of activity it involved created an expandable base for further 
research on the issues and topics it could investigate, which in turn then made possible additional 
new issues and topics of research in an evolutionary way.   
 
Suppose, then, we take sciences and research fields to be kinds of technologies – technologies of 
investigation.  Just as technologies are explanations of how certain things work, so sciences and 
research fields are explanations of how certain kinds of thinking about the world work.  Brian 
Arthur, the complexity theorist, then, has nicely explained in a non-Darwinian way how 
technologies evolve, and this provides us a way to think about how sciences and research fields 
evolve as special kinds of technologies (Arthur, 2009; cf. Davis, 2019).  
 
Consider first how biological evolution understood in a Darwinian way is a relatively 
constrained sort of process in comparison with the evolution of technologies.  A new type of 
animal or plant must always be closely related to its biological antecedents, since evolution 
proceeds through tight pillars of genetic inheritance.  In contrast, the evolution of technologies, 
and ideas, proceeds, in effect, in a promiscuous sort of way since new ‘organisms’ can be the 
product of many different technology parents that need not be not very closely related to one 
another.  On Arthur’s view, then, technologies advance through new combinations of different 
sub-assembly technologies, or relatively independent, simpler technology units.  These 
technology sub-assemblies are typically constructed with different goals and uses in mind, but 
when they are combined with other technology sub-assemblies in unanticipated ways, their goals 
and uses are re-purposed, and the new technologies they produce create new goals in regard to 
their desired uses.  One of Arthur’s best examples is the complex development of jet fighter 
aircraft capable of horizontal and vertical take-off (Ibid., pp. 39ff).  But our ordinary experience 
has many examples of how new technologies evolve out of combinations of older ones and 
produced in new goals for how to use them.  A great one is our current mobile phone that 
combines many sub-assembly originally unrelated technology functions with the original 
communication sub-assembly technology function (cf. Mazzucato, 2013). 
 
On this understanding of evolution, then, unlike in nature, the base upon which change builds is 
broader because inheritance patterns in technology change are less constrained and more open.  
The two main things that limits technology development are human imagination and the uses to 
which people determine technologies may be put.  In any case, the larger base on which change 
builds allows for a more rapid expansion of the base on which it can occur in the future, so that, 
unlike in nature, technology development potentially grows in an exponential sort of way.  What 
else limits this development, like in biological evolution, are the environmental conditions that 
influence what technologies are created and adopted and thus the direction this evolutionary 
process takes.  I emphasize this latter factor in the following section.   
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Turning back to economic methodology as a technology of investigation, the base on which it 
has developed since the 1980s is the topics of investigation associated with it when it came to be 
seen as a distinct field of investigation.  What Arthur’s approach then tells us is that, as a 
technology rather than a natural species, economic methodology at that time was capable of 
rapid expansion and growth – a process that favors change over continuity.  Consequently, the 
past success of economic methodology and its expanding base of activity should be expected to 
produce innovation and change – something we applaud – subject to the environmental 
conditions influencing its growth as a field.  If, following Arthur, then, just as contemporary 
technology change often seems dizzying to us, perhaps we should expect change and 
development in economic methodology to be a bit overwhelming as well.  Thus we might also 
say, in ‘owl of Minerva’ terms, that a greater speed of change means a greater delay in stock-
taking and historical reflection.  Accordingly, synthetic works telling what the field is that we 
currently miss are only yet to come, if with a growing lag. 
 
I close this framing with a pertinent question it naturally raises.  We know that technology 
change involves a continual replacement of past technologies with new technologies, and that 
past technologies can drop out of existence or be so changed in their form and uses that their new 
forms seem unrelated to their past ones.  Think if the evolution of ground vehicles from horse-
drawn to motorized.  Might then methodology, if we take it to be a kind of technology, also be 
evolving in such a ways as to become unrecognizable relative to how it once appeared, or even 
be evolving out of existence, just as have many now long-abandoned production and 
consumption technologies?  In order to investigate this question, the next section tracks the 
development of the field since the 1980s as a particular type of investigative technology, namely 
one that functions as a ‘meta’-field or a field of investigation derivative of another, economics. 
 
 
3. Change in economic methodology as a ‘meta’-field in relation to change in economics 
 
A meta-field is one that makes another field its object of investigation, which itself makes some 
domain in the world its object of investigation.  This derivative character makes research in the 
‘meta’-field depend on how it defines and understands the status of the primary field as a 
discipline, but that in turn is influenced by how that discipline defines and understands itself.  
Further, since, disciplines can be compared to one another in regard to their similarities and the 
differences between them regarding what they are thought to be about, how a primary discipline 
defines and understands itself also reflects how it sees its subject of investigation as being similar 
to and different from how neighboring disciplines understand their subjects of investigation.  At 
any point in time, then, a meta-field is consequently defined both by how the primary discipline 
it investigates defines itself and by how that discipline compares itself to its neighboring primary 
disciplines. 
 
Moreover, how different disciplines compare with one another can be understood in terms of 
how close or distant their subjects of investigation are, or rather how close or distant their 
practitioners see them. Most would agree, for example, that the subjects of investigation of 
chemistry and economics are distant from one another, and that the subjects of investigation of 
psychology and economics less so.  At the same time, many economists could regard what 
psychologists investigate as being as far removed from what they investigate as economics is to 
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what chemists investigate.  Indeed, I suggest (perhaps with some exaggeration) that this was how 
most economists regarded psychology (and most other social science disciplines) until quite 
recently, namely, as very far removed in its concerns from those of economics.  More recently, 
however, this view within economics has broken down in some degree, a change in thinking that 
corresponds to changes in how economists define their field and thus compare it to other social 
science fields.  Below, I will explain this in connection with a movement away from Lionel 
Robbins’ definition of economics toward Gary Becker’s definition of economics.   
 
First, however, consider how this change could have affected the methodology of economics as a 
meta-field derivative of economics.  The field became an active, successful domain of research, 
originally a field within the history of economic thought, in the early 1980s with the publication 
of influential books by Mark Blaug (1980) and Bruce Caldwell (1982).  At this time, then, 
neoclassicism dominated economics, and the Blaug and Caldwell books plus much additional 
research at the time was concerned with the epistemological status of neoclassicism.  Also, as 
Hands emphasizes (2019), this was when logical empiricist philosophy of science and the 
covering law model of explanation ceased to be much discussed by philosophers of science and 
methodologists.  Thus, that neoclassicism dominated economics, and that Institutionalism, 
Keynesianism, and Marxism occupied a diminished role in the field, methodological thinking 
became preoccupied with broad theories of how whole approaches characterized economics.  
The Kuhnian-Popperian-Lakatosian normative ‘theory appraisal’ approaches were then used to 
evaluate the status of neoclassicism.  Basically, that neoclassicism was the only game in town 
naturally suggested the ‘theory appraisal’ approach.   
 
There was an interesting tension in this methodological approach that some methodologists 
worried risked making methodology appear irrelevant to economics – a perennial concern in the 
field since the 1980s.  As many have noted, Popperian-Lakatosian ideas were not indigenous to 
economics or economic methodology, but were borrowed from the history and philosophy of 
science, in part because the field had yet to develop tools of analysis of its own.  Popperian 
falsificationism could be used to appraise neoclassicism, as Blaug strongly argued, but the term 
was imposed on neoclassicism rather than indigenous to it.  In contrast, most of the concepts 
used in neoclassical thinking, although some had origins outside economics, had been adapted to 
economics, and were in their new forms used there but not in other disciplines.  This, I argue, 
was instrumental in determining both how economics defined itself and its high degree of 
distance most economists perceived distinguished it from other social science disciplines. 
 
Robbins’ famous scarce resources definition of economics (Robbins, 1935), then, uses concepts 
largely indigenous to and especially belong to economics.  Robbins had a number of motivations 
in stating his definition, including a desire to distinguish economics from Classical economic 
thinking.  Yet an effect of his definition, intended or not, was to strengthen economics’ isolation 
from other social sciences.  Economics would increasingly draw on quantitative methods used 
elsewhere in science, but this was still consistent with it being a closed social science field.  
However, economic methodology, in drawing on philosophy of science, was not committed to 
this conception, and thus found itself as a meta-field evaluating economics in ways that seemed 
to many economists to have little to do with what they saw as economics’ distinctive social 
science identity.  An active philosophy of science research program nonetheless still developed 
within economic methodology, because the philosophy of science tools methodologists were 
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investigating were powerful and insightful.  So the community prospered, drawing on both the 
history of economics and the philosophy of science, despite its status within economics.  In the 
1980s, then, it was still called only economic methodology and not yet also philosophy of 
economics, because philosophical thinking was still largely limited to what came from the 
philosophy of (natural and physical) science.  Figure 1 shows these meta-field relationships. 
 
 
















Yet after methodology had stabilized itself as a particular type of meta-field, the object of its 
investigation changed its own identity as well as its relationship to other disciplines under the 
influence of the later Chicago School and Gary Becker’s redefinition of economics.  Becker 
asserted that what distinguishes economics is “not its subject matter but its approach,” contrary 
to an isolation view of economics, and then claimed argued that the “economic approach is 
uniquely powerful because it can integrate a wide range of human behavior” (Becker, 1976, p. 
5).  That approach, or method, employed three principles – utility maximizing behavior, the 
equilibrium concept, and stable preferences.  They did not necessarily apply only to economics 
despite their being developed by economists, and accordingly this method could potentially be 
generalized in explaining behavior in social science domains than in economics.  This changed 
economics’ relations to other social science disciplines since economists were in principle as 
capable of explaining their subject matters as were their own practitioners.  Thus, 
neoclassicism’s previous distancing of economics from the other social sciences gave way to 
Chicago School economic imperialism toward other disciplines (Davis, 2016).   
 
Yet relatively soon thereafter, with this door now open, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
(1979) inaugurated psychology’s own (‘reverse’) imperialism toward economics, giving rise in 
the 1990s to behavioral economics as a new field within economics.  If economics was purely a 
method of investigation independent of any particular subject matter, and that method distilled 
down to the theory of decision behavior, then psychology was equally free to offer explanations 
of topics that had traditionally belonged to exclusively to economics.   But this was just the 
beginning of other disciplines’ re-orientation toward economics.  Game theory, imported 
originally from mathematics before the war’s end but long ignored in the first decades after the 
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war, now colonized another new domain of decision theory.  Later, following the lead of 
psychology, neuroscience created a new field of neuroeconomics.  Accordingly, the last several 
decades are fairly characterized as a period in which economics acquired many interrelationships 
with other disciplines. 
 
Economics’ early post-war self-isolation from other disciplines was thus changed from both 
inside and outside of economics, and this change in economics’ definition and its relationships to 
other disciplines changed economic methodology’s meta-field objects of investigation.  If in the 
1980s economics was basically neoclassical economics, the effects of Becker’s change in its 
definition and the Chicago’s School’s economics imperialism program inadvertently led to 
economics getting relabeled, appropriately ambiguously, as ‘mainstream’ rather than 
neoclassical economics.  Indeed, as other-science contents increasingly came to play greater 
roles in economic explanations, the neoclassical label simply became historically outdated 
(Colander, 2000; Colander et al., 2004; Davis, 2006, 2008). 
 
We see, then, two main developments  in economic methodology around this time or reactions to 
the changing nature of economics that begin to reflect changes in its own object of investigation.  
First, there was a call to attend to and describe in a non-normative way economists’ actual 
practices (Backhouse et al., 1998; Hausman, 1992).  If what economics was had become less 
clear, then the recommendation was to start at the ground level and ask what the phenomena it 
investigated were.  Rather than grand theory appraisal, this was thus methodology on a smaller 
scale, or methodology with a small ‘m’ (McCloskey, 1985, 1994).  Hands (2001, 2018) 
characterizes this shift as a turn to naturalism that made phenomena essentially as they are found 
in science the primary subject of investigation, and that set aside both evaluation of the theories 
that produced them as well as their explanation in terms of broad theories of science.  While the 
history of economics, then, had played a smaller role in the Kuhnian-Popperian-Lakatosian 
methodology period, now it acquired new responsibilities and opportunities since it was in the 
best position to inventory and explain the variety of concepts and principles that economics 
employed.  For a time, the relationship between economic methodology and the history of 
economics thus strengthened. 
 
Second, recognizing that economics now increasingly interacted with other disciplines also 
justified widening the scope of philosophical reasoning brought to bear on it in a way that meant 
going beyond what the philosophy of science had to offer.  Hands also gave clear statement of 
this in his Reflections Without Rules book that surveyed “recent work in economic methodology 
and the various developments within contemporary science theory that are relevant to it” (Hands, 
2001, ix).  Gilles Campagnolo has more recently also picked up on this in characterizing 
economic philosophy as “the study of fundamental values and principles of economic theories, 
the study of the structures, the meanings, the impact and the limits of rationality in action, 
ontology, methodology, and epistemology” (Campagnolo, 2019; see Hands, 2019).   
 
I asserted at the end of the last section, then, that evolutionary change always takes place in 
particular environmental circumstances which influence the speed and direction of that change.  
Coinciding with the change in economics’ definition and relationship to other disciplines, two 
institutional, environmental developments occurred around this time that had an important 
impact on economic methodology as a field.  First, economics doctoral programs in the U.S. 
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increased their emphasis on quantitative skills, and eliminated history of economics programs 
from which methodology had emerged in the 1980s from their curricula in one major university 
program after another.  Second, also at this time there began to be more philosophy doctoral 
training in philosophy of economics, particularly outside the U.S. in Europe, which generally 
saw the philosophy of economics as a specialization within philosophy of science.   
 
Together, these two environmental changes tended to reduce the weight given to the history of 
economics as a foundation for economic methodology, while tending to expand the repertoire of 
philosophical concepts used in methodological arguments.  This weakened the link between 
history of economics reasoning and economic methodology, and increased both philosophical 
reasoning in the field and the weight given to the label philosophy of economics in 
characterizations of the field.   
 
Given methodologists’ emphasis at the time on economists’ practices, the history of economics 
still played a role in the field, but with reduced training in it, this was less and less able to be 
sustained.  Most historians and methodologists of economics devote most of their teaching time 
to standard courses in economics, and accordingly had an inside understanding of its intuitions 
and rationales.  In contrast, people trained in philosophy programs mostly teach philosophy 
courses and rarely economics ones.  Accordingly, their intuitions rather developed around 
fundamental ideas in philosophy.  A hybrid case and exception is the field of science studies that 
aims to explain sciences in terms of their own historical and philosophical development. 
 
Thus, to historically revise Figure 1, it seems that the history of economics connection should be 
given less emphasis, and the philosophy (and history) of science side of the field should basically 
be replaced simply by philosophy of economics. Figure 2 summarizes these new relationships 
from the 1990s to the present that appear to have transformed the field in such a way that it 
should now be labeled economic methodology/philosophy of economics, a meta-field with 
mainstream economics with its relationships to other disciplines as its object of investigation. 
 
 
















As a meta-field, then, economic methodology/philosophy of economics is now a more complex 
kind of investigation than was economic methodology in the 1980s.  On the one hand, its object 
of investigation, economics with its altered definition of itself, has changed in terms of how it 
sees itself as similar to and different from other disciplines.  On the other hand, as a meta-field 
type of discipline its own relationships to other meta-disciplines is more complicated than before.  
If in the 1980s economic methodology drew in a fairly instrumental way from only one 
particular current in philosophy and history of science, the growing importance to it of 
philosophy per se since the 1990s has brought a much larger array of philosophical concepts and 
theories into the field.  Moreover, the relationship between these two sides of the field is 
somewhat unsettled, since there is a tension between a more historical, economics-specific type 
of investigation and one that grounds itself in more abstract philosophical concepts and theories.   
 
If we return, then, to the Journal of Economic Methodology Millennium 2001 special issue, I 
believe we can see this broad shift in thinking already in process.  While there is some discussion 
of the demarcationist normative theory appraisal approach, it is limited and most of the papers in 
the issue make pointed reference to new issues and speculate on where methodology is going.  
JEM was first published in 1994 (as a successor to Methodus which had begun in 1989), and so 
the process of change in the field I have described was already on-going.  In their “Introduction” 
to the issue, the editors thus reasonably refrain from summarizing where methodology is going, 
and say their goal is to “open up new lines of inquiry” (Editors, 2001).         
 
Consider also the evolution of Economics and Philosophy, which had begun earlier in 1985 
under the editorship of Dan Hausman and Michael McPherson.  In the early issues, economic 
methodologists and economists were the main contributors, but over time more and more papers 
have been from philosophers and the journal now draws research primarily from philosophers.  
So if JEM at the Millennium signals that change in the field is in full swing, E&P came to 
register this change more directly in terms of who was increasingly contributing to the field.   
 
Let us return, then, to the issue of change and evolution of fields and disciplines with which this 
discussion began.  The next section, then, attempts to extrapolate the recent past change in the 
field into the future.  
 
 
4. One possible future scenario 
   
One possible scenario, then, emphasizes the environmental factors currently in place shaping the 
field.  Thus, the change in doctoral training noted above seems likely to continue to diminish the 
meta-field’s origins in economics and history of economics, and expand its basis in philosophy.  
As fewer individuals in the field are trained in economics, and also teach it, and as a greater 
share are trained in philosophy, and teach it, the field is likely to increasingly frame economic 
reasoning in terms of philosophical reasoning.  Economic reasoning is carried out at the level of 
economic concepts and theories, and implicitly or explicitly recognizes economics’ history.  The 
reasoning in philosophy of economics is carried out at and framed by a higher level of 
abstraction, and implicitly or explicitly relies instead on the history of philosophy.  In effect, the 
primary issues in philosophy of economics are philosophical whereas in economic methodology 
circa 1980 they are mostly economic.   
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Consider, for example, the concept of causality, an active area of research in philosophy of 
economics, especially since logical empiricism with its covering law model of explanation has 
been largely given up.  In economics, interpretations of causal relationships are very much tied to 
visions of how the economy works.  In contrast, in philosophy causality is investigated according 
to the many competing theories of causation per se.  These theories are certainly relevant to how 
causality is understood in economics, but how they are understood in connection with it is more 
aimed at resolving debates over theories of causation than intervening in debates in economics. 
 
Note that this shift in levels of abstraction may cut against economic methodology’s 1990s call 
and recommendation to focus on economists’ actual practices.  For economic methodologists, 
this had meant moving from asking why economists employed certain types of explanations to 
asking how their explanations worked.  Philosophy, I believe, is very much an investigation of 
why questions, and how questions serve at best to illustrate these deeper issues.  Thus, at the time 
when methodology, having given up the normative theory appraisal approach, was forming a 
new consensus regarding the need for more practice-focused how investigations, philosophers of 
economics, who were gaining in influence in the field, were generally asking the more traditional 
why questions, not of the Kuhnian-Popperian-Lakatosian kind, but rather of the kind that 
Campagnolo describes.   
 
Figure 3, then, summarizes how economic methodology/philosophy of economics in Figure 2 
might evolve on this scenario.  In the extreme, the economic methodology-history of economics 
link in Figure 2 is increasingly replaced by only a link to philosophy of economics, while the 
focus on mainstream economics in its relation to other social science disciplines is replaced by 
increasingly seeing economics as one example of a social science field and application of 
philosophical reasoning to it as a representative social science. 
 
 
















This scenario, then, extrapolates current trends in the field under one particular set of 
environmental conditioning factors.  In it, since economics has changed its identity, the identity 
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of the meta-field that investigates it has changed as well.  Or alternatively, what Figure 3 might 
describe is how, from the perspective of its origins in the 1980s, economic methodology as a 
meta-field is on a path which will eventually cause it to cease to exist and be replaced by another 
meta-field, philosophy of economics, with related but ultimately different goals.  As Arthur’s 
analysis of technology shows, technologies not only evolve and change but in some cases cease 
to exist altogether when they are replaced by others.  What determines this balance between 
continuity and change are the uses to which technologies are put.  In this scenario, the uses to 
which the philosophy of economics is being put replace the uses to which the methodology of 
economics were put. 
 
Note, however, that this extrapolation somewhat narrowly depends on how a particular set of 
technologies are influenced by a particular set of environmental developments that affect those 
technologies.  Missing from this scheme, then, is any ‘big picture’ representation of how the 
overall technology landscape itself evolves, and how this might affect individual technologies 
and the particular ones I have focused upon.  I return, then, to Arthur’s general argument and 
what it implies about how entire technology landscapes evolve, and then ask how this might 
imply about the meta-field economic methodology/philosophy of economics.   
 
 
5. Another possible future scenario 
 
In Arthur’s analysis, technology change compared to natural change creates a relative abundance 
of new kinds of ‘organisms’ because it does not travel through the more constrained, pillar-
based, within-species patterns of inheritance of the Darwinian model.  It follows that the 
diversity of kinds of technologies should increase at a greater rate than the diversity of natural 
kinds.  Thus, we when we think about overall technology landscapes, we need to think about 
how diverse they are and what affects this.  For Arthur, then, how diverse the overall technology 
landscape is at any time is determined by three things: the human creative process, the uses to 
which people determine technologies can be put, and the rate of investment in new technologies.  
The latter factor especially concerns a classic concept in economics: the division of labor and 
specialization. 
 
In the history of economics, interest in the nature and role of the division of labor and 
specialization in economic systems goes back to Adam Smith famous thinking about the subject 
(Smith, 1776; 1937).  But the speed of technology change has also made the concepts important 
to philosophy of science thinking, for example to Thomas Kuhn in his post-paradigm view of 
change in science (Kuhn, 2000).  Generally, then, many thinkers have been ambivalent about the 
effects of specialization, seeing it on the one hand as both inevitable and beneficial aspect of 
economic development and on the other as risking producing an increasingly fragmented world, 
both socially and economically (Davis, 2019; Trautwein, 2017).  I put these judgements aside, 
however, in an attempt to describe what increasing specialization might instead mean to the 
evolution of economic methodology/philosophy of economics technology landscape. 
 
Thus, I take Smith’s famous position regarding specialization as essentially correct.  He argued 
that how far specialization proceeds depends on the extent of the market, or the extent of 
economic growth.  The market in his view overcomes potential economic fragmentation effects 
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of specialization (though not necessarily the ill social fragmentation effects of specialization, for 
example, in the increasingly tedious character of work).  Thus, combining Arthur’s view of 
technology evolution and Smith’s prediction that specialization always increases in systems that 
expand, we should expect the niches in which technologies operate to increase and sustain their 
development over time.  As an overall technology landscape evolves, so the niches it creates 
expand as well,  That is, for both Arthur and Smith the two levels of development interact and 
reinforce one another.  To take a contemporary example, while some pharmaceuticals are widely 
used for many people and others are only used for particular groups of people, the development 
of both is arguably connected in the science behind their development. 
 
Returning to the primary field/meta-field relationship, on this view, then, the overall technology 
landscape at issue is economics and how it evolves, and within it there exist multiple, evolving 
and interacting niche meta-fields.  The argument above regarding Figure 3 emphasized 
environmental factors affecting these niche fields, but a specialization view of the overall 
landscape implies that niches, once created, are likely to be sustained as long as the overall 
landscape in which they operate continues to expand. 
 
This is not inevitable.  Historically, we know that some technologies are fully replaced by later 
ones.  Whether, then, a niche and the specialized activity occurring within it is sustained depends 
on whether its uses continue to exist and investments in it continue to be made.  More broadly, 
specialization is driven by the perceived value payoff delivered by an activity thought not to be 
delivered by others activities.  Thus on this argument, Figure 4 projects an alternative scenario to 
Figure 3 in which diversity in meta-field investigations of economics is sustained as long as 
those investigations continue to be seen as useful and valuable, and as long as the primary field 
on which they depend itself continues to expand.  
 
 





       economic methodology  ↔  history of economics    //     philosophy of economics 
 
                                                ↓                                       ↔                        ↓ 
 








The ‘//’ symbol is meant to indicate that these two related meta-fields that are nonetheless 
different sorts of disciplines, while the ‘↔’ symbol beneath it is meant to indicate that they 
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nonetheless share an investigation based on having a single primary subject of investigation.  
The ↔ symbol between the two versions of the primary field in the bottom line accordingly 
indicates there is primary discipline or field, albeit with different labels or interpretations.   
 
On the view that in growing systems specialization continues and tends to be sustained – the idea 
of a world of technologies increasingly characterized by diversity – Figure 4 is expandable to 
allow for the admission of additional future meta-fields beyond the two emphasized here.  A 
strong candidate for future inclusion is the meta-field of economics and ethics that examines 
economics as a primary field from the perspective of ethics and moral philosophy rather than 
philosophy of science.  That this meta-field has grown significantly in recent decades (Peil and 
van Staveren, 2009; White, 2019) seems to be a consequence of influential contributions from 
John Rawls, John Harsanyi, Amartya Sen, Ken Binmore, and others, but I postpone discussion of 
this and economics and ethics’ meta-field status and its relation to economic 
methodology/philosophy of economics to another occasion.  
 
If Figure 3, then, is more complicated than Figure 2 for the reasons stated above, Figure 4 adds 
further complications associated with these meta-fields now being both communicating and non-
communicating disciplines of investigation.  There is a large literature on different kinds of 
disciplinary relationships between primary fields, but quite a bit less on different kinds of 
disciplinary relationships between meta-fields.  I turn below in the next section of the paper to 
brief comments on what different sorts of disciplinary relationships these meta-fields might have.     
 
 
6. Disciplinary relationships between economics meta-fields 
 
Though there are many ways in which relationships between different disciplines have been 
characterized and explained, I simply draw on the taxonomy of four forms developed by Jordi 
Cat in his the Stanford Encyclopedia “Unity of Science” article.    
 
Interdisciplinary research or collaboration creates a new discipline or project, such as 
interfield research, often leaving the existence of the original ones 
intact.  Multidisciplinary work involves the juxtaposition of the treatments and aims of the 
different disciplines involved in addressing a common problem.  Crossdisciplinary work 
involves borrowing resources from one discipline to serve the aims of a project in another.  
Transdisciplinary work is a synthetic creation that encompasses work from different 
disciplines (Cat 2017: sect. 3.3). 
 
Cat’s taxonomy allows us to order these four forms according to the degrees of integration of 
different disciplines they each involve.  The least integrated case is interdisciplinarity, the most 
integrated case is transdisciplinarity, and the multidisciplinarity and crossdisciplinarity cases are 
intermediate in different ways.  Thus, transferring this scheme from primary fields to meta-fields, 
the issue Figure 4 raises is what the ‘//’ symbol involves.  On the assumption that at the current 
time and likely in the future neither of Cat’s two extreme cases, the least and most integrated 
different discipline cases, do not characterize the relationship between economic methodology 
(history of economics) and philosophy of economics, their relationship is either one of 
multidisciplinarity or crossdisciplinarity.  Consider how they compare. 
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Multidisciplinarity is where our two meta-disciplines would juxtapose different “treatments and 
aims of the different [meta-]disciplines involved in addressing a common problem.”  
Crossdisciplinarity is where our two meta-disciplines would behave instrumentally toward one 
another, “borrowing resources from one [meta-]discipline to serve the aims of a project in [the] 
other.”  Thus, multidisciplinarity is the more integrated case, and crossdisciplinarity is the less 
integrated case.  How, then, might we consequently explain the relationship between economic 
methodology (with history of economics) and philosophy of economics in the foreseeable future?   
 
The instrumental crossdisciplinarity borrowing case already seems to characterize the two fields 
since people trained in each interact with each other personally, as co-authors, and in 
conferences, and, while they often publish in field-specific locations, they also publish in 
locations that draw people from both fields.  This has indeed been one part of the mission that 
Hands and I have tried to maintain – to make the Journal of Economic Methodology a place for 
this sort of shared communication for researchers from different backgrounds. 
 
The multidisciplinarity juxtaposition-common problem view is more difficult to project as a 
possible evolution of the current state of affairs because of researchers’ different kinds of 
doctoral training and the professional incentives they create.  What might influence this is 
economics’ own future development.  Becker’s redefinition of economics as decision theory 
juxtaposes different disciplines investigations to one another and created common problems.  
This then gave rise to a somewhat unified meta-field development, as represented in Figure 2, at 
least for important parts of economics.  However, I argued above moving to Figure 3 that on one 
possible scenario this state of affairs could break down as the philosophy of economics 
increasingly supplanted economic methodology.  In effect, economics becoming decision theory, 
combined with environmental changes in doctoral training, seems to shift the meta-field 
landscape toward philosophy of economics.   
 
Yet it seems it is unrealistic to think that Becker’s changed view of economics will become a 
settled view of economics on into the future.  The economics-psychology connection it fostered 
has certainly been transformative for economics, but there has also been a host of additional 
other-science influences operating on economics – experimentalism, complexity theory, 
institutionalism – that  raise questions about how economists and others may define the field in 
the future.  Whether, then, these possible developments continue to favor philosophy, as Figure 3 
projects, is difficult to determine.  However, on the general argument from Smith and Arthur I 
have employed, since the overall landscape of primary and meta-field technologies is a growing 
one, sustainable specialization seems likely to continue and expand, if in ways too soon for us to 
say much about.  Figure 4, then, is both open-ended and more complicated because the future of 
the primary field these meta-fields depend upon is unclear.  In the closing section, accordingly, I 
draw a few conclusions about the general character of economic methodology and philosophy of 
economics as meta-field research. 
 
 
7. Diversity and pluralism in economic methodology and philosophy of economics  
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The special issue of Journal of Economic Methodology that Wade Hands and I designed was 
intended to encourage authors to freely address subjects they thought were important and 
perhaps insufficiently well appreciated, while allowing them to determine the balance between 
continuity and change in the overall field however they understood it.  We also consciously 
invited both senior and younger contributors in the expectation that if there were cohort effects in 
topic selection, this would bring them out, and avoid biasing the issue in a backward-looking or 
forward-looking way.  We leave it to future readers of the issue, then, to judge how the overall 
mix has turned out and how it compares with the Millennium issue twenty years earlier. 
 
Nonetheless, the Smith-Arthur argument I have used does suggest a possible future for economic 
methodology-philosophy of economics.  Its main conclusion is that its divisions of labor and 
forms of specialization are characteristic of growing systems, and that increasing diversity in 
research in the field, not less, is what we should expect of it in the future.  Thus, just as there 
should continue to be specialists in fields, for example, that examine the details of disappearing 
languages and the strategies behind long-forgotten battles, so there should continue to be 
specialists in economic methodology-philosophy of economics that examine unanticipated topics 
with connections to economics yet uninvestigated.   
 
Does this project a future of greater and greater intellectual fragmentation in which 
communication becomes more difficult and costly?  Might, for example, economic 
methodologists’ historical investigations of the intricacies of rent theory and philosophers of 
economics’ investigations of the epistemological significance for economics of Kant versus 
Hegel fragment their shared field? 
 
What all four of the Figures above say regarding this question is that, compared to primary 
fields, meta-fields actually have an advantage in communicating with one another because they 
broadly share the subject from which they are derived, and this acts to limit and anchor their 
respective domains of specialization.  This integration may not rise to the level of 
multidisciplinarity, or if so only on certain topics and from time to time, but it seems 
crossdisciplinarity, if irregular and unpredictable in its directions, is likely a fair description of 
this shared investigation of economics.   
 
Economics meta-fields, it’s worth noting, make one important case for pluralism in economics 
because they demonstrate that diversity is compatible with and indeed derived from a general 
development of economics.  This is one kind of unity of science argument, but it places weight 
not on a conceptual coherence, which has arguably been and may still be an ambition of much 
unity of science thinking, but rather on a ‘unity’ in science derived at the level of practices and 
institutions.  As such, I argue pluralism both describes the economic methodology-philosophy of 
economics landscape, and also amounts to a program those in the field ought to promote and 
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